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Radbruch’s Rechtsstaat and 
Schmitt’s Legal Order: Legalism, 
Legality, and the Institution of Law 
Mireille Hildebrandt∗ 
Abstract 
This article forages the fruits of Radbruch’s Legal Philosophy of 1932, taking into account 
his writings after the horrors of National Socialism in Germany. This contribution builds 
on the findings of my chapter concerning Radbruch’s inquiry into the origins of the 
criminal law, in Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law. In that chapter I present the rise 
of the sovereign state as a precondition for a Rule of Law that institutes a balancing act 
between the different powers of the state. In the current article I briefly present the rise 
of the Rule of Law in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, exemplified 
by the rise of the German Rechtsstaat, the French État de Droit and the Anglo-American 
Rule of Law. This provides the background for a discussion of the contribution that 
Radbruch’s antinomian concept of law can make to a better understanding of the 
difference between legalism and legality. I argue that a mistaken view on legality informs 
the prevalent confusion around the notion of the Rule of Law. The investigation is 
complemented with the introduction of a procedural conception of both law and the 
Rule of Law, taking the discussion beyond formal and substantial conceptions of both. 
Finally, I integrate an analysis of Schmitt’s keen attention to the institution of law, 
observing that legalism and legality align with different institutionalizations, different legal 
orders and different modes of existence of law and the Rule of Law.  
I. Introduction 
Radbruch’s legal philosophy is a complex refinement of a particular strand of neo-Kantian 
philosophy,1 which understands concepts such as law, state, punishment, or property as 
inherently value-laden concepts. Radbruch believes that such concepts can only be 
properly understood if they are related to the idea that informs them. Contrary to 
rationalist natural law thinkers this idea is not a universal value that can be defined outside 
the context of its inception. For Radbruch these concepts are Kulturbegriffe (cultural 
concepts) that describe a value-laden reality, and the task of the legal philosopher is to 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Smart Environments, Data Protection and the Rule of Law at the Institute of Computing 
and Information Sciences (iCIS), Science Faculty, Radboud University Nijmegen; Professor of Technology 
Law and Law in Technology at the Research Group of Law, Science, Technology and Society Studies 
(LSTS) at the Faculty of Law and Criminology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel; and Associate Professor of 
Jurisprudence at the Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam, the Netherlands. I want to thank the participants 
of the CAL workshop in Toronto in August of 2014, and notably thank Markus Dubber for his suggestion 
to confront Radbruch with Dicey’s understanding of the Rule of Law. 
1 See the so-called Baden or Heidelberg School (notably Windelband and Rickert): Anthony K. Jensen, Neo-
Kantianism, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013) (http://www.iep.utm.edu/neo-kant).  
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clarify the values that give meaning and significance to the reality they inform. Radbruch’s 
antinomian conception of law shows that law in a constitutional democracy is a 
fundamentally contradictory phenomenon that implies a reiterative balancing act between 
the values of legal certainty, justice and expedience. The shifting emphasis on either of 
these values is not arbitrary but operates on the nexus of the concept of law, the idea that 
gives direction to its interpretation, and on the societal needs these values serve. 
Radbruch’s postwar emphasis on justice as potentially overruling legal certainty has led 
some to interpret his postwar writings as a return to natural law and a change in his 
position.2 However, in his seminal text on the origin of criminal law of 1938 Radbruch 
already found that the arbitrary power of the pater familias to punish his serfs entailed that 
the jurisdiction within the household of the pater familias should be understood as a pre-
legal order, closer to administration than to law.3 In line with this, we should expect that 
insofar as absolute sovereignty allows for arbitrary rule, Radbruch would have qualified it 
as a non-legal order, even before his experience of Nazi brutality.  
In this article, my aim is to uncover the added value of Radbruch’s understanding 
of law for contemporary debates on both law and the Rule of Law. First, I will briefly 
present the rise of the Rule of Law in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, exemplified by the rise of the German Rechtsstaat, the French État de Droit and 
the Anglo-American Rule of Law.4 This provides the backbone for my discussion of how 
Radbruch’s antinomian concept of law helps to better understand the difference between 
legalism and legality. In fact, I often find that legality is defined as legalism, and I believe 
this triggers the prevalent confusion around the notion of the Rule of Law. Building on, 
for instance, Waldron, I will argue that we need a procedural concept of both law and the 
Rule of Law,5 to get a better picture of the difference between legalism and legality, taking 
the discussion beyond the dichotomy of formal and substantial conceptions. Finally, to 
substantiate the pivotal role of procedure, I integrate an analysis of Schmitt’s keen 
attention to the institution of law, observing—however—that legalism and legality align 
with different institutionalizations, different legal orders and different modes of existence 
of law and the Rule of Law.  
                                                 
2 E.g., Heather Leawoods, Gustav Radbruch: An Extraordinary Legal Philosopher, 2 J.L. & Pol’y 489 
(2000); Stanley L. Paulson, Radbruch on Unjust Laws: Competing Earlier and Later Views?, 15 Oxford J. 
Legal Stud. 489 (1995). 
3 Gustav Radbruch, Der Ursprung des Strafrechts aus dem Stande der Unfreien, in Elegantiae Juris 
Criminalis: Vierzehn Studien zur Geschichte des Strafrechts 12 (1938) (English translation available in 
Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law 407 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2014) 
(http://www.oup.com/uk/law/foundational-texts). 
4 E.g., Jacques Chevallier, L’État de droit (2010); The Legal Doctrines of the Rule of Law and the Legal 
State (James R. Silkenat et al. eds., 2014). The latter contains a trove of both mainstream and controversial 
understandings of the Anglo-American concept of the Rule of Law and the continental European concept 
of the Rechtsstaat, detailed by authors from across both types of legal traditions.  
5 I capitalize the Rule of Law, not merely to pay my respects, but to prevent confusion with the connotation 
of a particular rule/norm of law, cf. Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 1 
n.1 (2008). 
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II. The Rise of the Rule of Law 
A. Germany: Substantive and Formal Conceptions of the Rechtsstaat 
The term Rechtsstaat was inspired by Kant’s legal and political philosophy. It 
became part of nineteenth-century German constitutional doctrine during the transition 
from the Prussian state to the unification of the German empire.6 The term, however, 
referred to two distinct conceptions within constitutional doctrine, developed by two 
leading scholars deeply involved with the so-called Polizeiwissenschaft.7 The latter term 
translates as “science of police,” but it is not merely about how police constables regulate 
daily life or struggle against criminal conduct. Rather, this “science of police” developed a 
scientific understanding of how to construct and sustain an effective administration, close 
to what we would now consider “policy science.” The liberal professor of political science 
and law von Mohl was mainly concerned with the limitation of internal sovereignty and 
the protection of individual rights and liberties. In his monumental Die deutsche 
Polizeiwissenschaft nach den Grundsätzen des Rechtsstaates he defends the idea that in a 
Rechtsstaat, the Polizei—the administration—must be exercised under the Rule of Law.8 
This is usually understood as entailing substantive requirements for a state to qualify as a 
Rechtsstaat. The conservative constitutional law professor Stahl, however, was mainly 
concerned with the need to rationalize the relationship between citizen and state in order 
to achieve policy objectives regarding the welfare of society. In his monumental Die 
Philosophie des Rechts nach geschichtlicher Ansicht, he outlines those tasks of the government 
(Polizei) that should remain outside the scope of judicial review (Justiz)—the reason being 
that the administration requires the freedom to act unhindered in order to serve and 
expand the general interest.9 Whereas he situates private law and criminal law in the 
domain of Justiz, administration—for Stahl—is not a matter of law at all. This implies that 
citizens cannot call their government’s administration to account in a court of law.  
Von Mohl is said to defend a substantive conception of the Rechtsstaat, that aligns 
the demands of justice with those of legal certainty and expediency. He advocated a 
constitutional state that protects the negative liberty of its citizens and refrains from 
interventions that violate individual rights. This implies that to qualify as a Rechtsstaat the 
normative content of the constitution must be taken into account, and notably the 
                                                 
6 On the transition from formal to substantive conceptions of the German Rechtsstaat, the French État de 
Droit and the Anglo-American Rule of Law in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see 
Chevallier, supra note 4. On the development of the German formal and substantive conceptions of the 
Rechtsstaat, see id. at 16-23; see also Rainer Grote, The German Rechtsstaat in a Comparative Perspective, in 
The Legal Doctrines of the Rule of Law and the Legal State, supra note 4, at 193. 
7 On the relevance of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Polizeiwissenschaft for current understandings of 
criminal law and administration, see The New Police Science: The Police Power in Domestic and 
International Governance (Markus D. Dubber & Mariana Valverde eds., 2006); Mireille Hildebrandt, 
Governance, Governmentality, Police and Justice: A New Science of Police, 56 Buff. L. Rev. 557 (2008). 
8 Robert von Mohl, Die Polizei-Wissenschaft nach den Grundsätzen des Rechtsstaates (1866). 
9 Friedrich Julius Stahl, Die Philosophie des Rechts nach geschichtlicher Ansicht (1963) (3 vols., 1830-37). 
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protection that is effectively provided against both misdeeds of other citizens and 
oppression by the state itself. Stahl is said to defend a formal conception of the Rechtsstaat 
that separates the domain of justice (where the state must indeed respect the negative 
liberties of its citizens) from that of police (where the state enjoys unrestricted positive 
freedom to maximize the general interest). Under the formal conception, to qualify as a 
Rechtsstaat the domain of police should not be brought under the control of justice. Since 
in that view, ultimately, the decision on what belongs in the realm of police is up to the 
state, subjects of the state are dependent on the arbitrary rule of whoever holds the place 
of the sovereign. Because the domain of police is the domain of administration, this 
basically reduces sovereignty to administration.  
It is critical to note that from a historical perspective the term police-state first refers 
to eighteenth-century absolutism, including the reign of the enlightened despotism of, for 
instance, Frederick the Great. Taking into account von Stahl’s separate domain of Polizei 
(administration), which was meant to provide a productive positive freedom for the state to 
serve the general interest, we can observe a clear continuity between eighteenth-century 
Polizeistaaten and the beginnings of the welfare state in nineteenth-century Germany. 
The follow-up of the debate between von Mohl and Stahl can be traced in the 
positions taken by the twentieth-century legal philosophers Kelsen (Austrian), Schmitt 
and Radbruch (German).10 Kelsen tried to get rid of the authoritarian connotations of the 
sovereign by rethinking the state as constituted by the law which is also its product, thus 
emulating the concept of the legal norm and creating an a-historical and a-political, highly 
systemized perspective on the law. The mutual constitution of state and law, nevertheless, 
assumed an intrinsic dependence on formal, legally constituted authority that tied Kelsen 
to the formal conception of the Rechtsstaat. Schmitt, unlike Kelsen, highlighted the pre-
legal decision that grounds any legal order, thus prioritizing the decisionist aspect of a 
legal order over and above its normative aspect. This entailed a rejection of the sterile 
formality of Kelsen’s legal state, without, however, engaging with von Mohl’s substantive 
requirements. Kelsen ends up with the purest form of a highly sophisticated legalism, at 
the same time providing a wonderful abstract representation of a pyramidal legal system 
where every legal rule—and thus any competence to act—ultimately depends on the 
vanishing point at the top. Schmitt rejects such legalism as naïve, but ends up with a 
highly sophisticated as well as brutal decisionism. Even the highly complex hierarchical 
reciprocities of suzerainty acknowledged the need to legitimize one’s rule in terms of the 
res publica, thus rejecting any such thing as a purely arbitrary occupatio.11 Below we will 
encounter Schmitt’s ultimate position, which was basically a rejection of his own earlier 
                                                 
10 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 2005) (1934); Hans Kelsen, General Theory 
of Law and State (Anders Wedberg trans., 1999) (1945); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on 
the Concept of Sovereignty (George Schwab trans., 2005) (1922). 
11 Mireille Hildebrandt, Radbruch on the Origins of the Criminal Law: Punitive Interventions before 
Sovereignty, in Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law 219 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2014) [hereinafter 
Hildebrandt, Origins]; Mireille Hildebrandt, The Indeterminacy of an Emergency: Challenges to Criminal 
Jurisdiction in Constitutional Democracy, 4 Crim. L. & Phil. 161 (2010) [hereinafter Hildebrandt, Indeterminacy]. 
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decisionism, seeking refuge in what he coined “concrete order thinking.” Radbruch 
refused to reduce law to either Kelsen’s normativism or Schmitt’s decisionism, though he 
clearly acknowledged their importance. In the constitutive aims of the law, he integrated 
formal as well as substantial requirements, while leaving room for both liberalist and 
socialist purposes for the law. On the instrumentality or purposiveness of the law, 
Radbruch was a convinced relativist. As is well known, he did, however, draw the line 
against fascist instrumentalization of the law. In the third section of this article we will 
further situate Radbruch’s so-called antinomian concept of law between and beyond 
formal and substantive conceptions of law.  
B. France: État Légal and État de Droit 
The idea that a constitutional state depends on formal requirements, most notably 
that it requires legal grounds in a Parliamentary Act for any of its interventions, can be 
traced back to nineteenth-century France (and to the English notion of the Rule of Law, 
see below). The popular sovereignty that was at the heart of postrevolutionary France 
implied that the democratic legislator representing the nation was the only source of law. 
This introduced the nineteenth-century French doctrinal notion of the État Légal, which 
was opposed to the eighteenth-century État Police of the Ancien Régime.12 From the point of view 
of the État Légal the state is bound by previously enacted legal norms without regard for 
their normative content. Unlike Stahl’s conception of the Rechtsstaat, however, adherents 
to the État Légal did not accept a separate domain for the state’s interventions outside 
enacted law. Nevertheless, they did not accept the idea of courts overruling the nation as 
represented in Parliamentary Acts. Though French doctrine, unlike the German doctrine 
of the separation of Polizei and Justiz, denied the administration any leeway to operate 
outside the imperatives of the legislator, the interventions of administrative bodies and 
officials were to be reviewed in special administrative procedures. Decisions taken by 
public authorities on behalf of the nation (services publiques) were seen to be of a different 
kind than those of ordinary citizens, requiring review by the authority that took the 
decision, or its immediate hierarchical superior. This kind of internal review or appeal, and 
the concomitant assumption that government authority cannot be called to account on 
the basis of a common law that defines the legitimate mutual expectations of citizens, was 
considered a gruesome violation of the Rule of Law by lawyers on the other side of the 
Channel, such as Dicey. As with Germany, developments in France show a clear 
continuity with the État de Police of the Ancien Régime. Under the latter, the domain of police 
covered the whole realm of government, while the État Legal was instituted by a popular 
sovereignty that—in line with a specific understanding of democracy—made government 
officials relatively immune against the appeals of individual citizens. Though, as we will 
see below, even the English Rule of Law was tested by increased government activism to 
promote the general interest, common law protection against government violations of 
fundamental rights seemed—according to some—better equiped to deal with the 
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ramifications of the welfare state than the interventions of nineteenth-century German 
Polizei and French police.  
After the Second World War the notion of the État de Droit emerged,13 
acknowledging that law is both more and less than the enactments of the democratic 
legislator, introducing independent judicial review and a more substantive test of 
interventions by the state—based on a human rights doctrine that is often associated with 
a substantive conception of the Rule of Law. The French notion of the État de Droit 
actually comes close to the German substantive conception of the Rechtsstaat and to 
similar conceptions of the Rule of Law in the context of Anglo-American law. It may be, 
however, that in the latter context the notion of a procedural conception of the Rule of 
Law better describes what is at stake, complementing the dichotomy of formal and 
substantive conceptions. 
C. England: The Rule of Law and the Role of Courts 
In his Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885), Dicey 
formulated the Rule of Law as follows: 
We mean, in the first place, that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer 
in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal 
manner before the ordinary Courts of the land. In this sense the Rule of Law is 
contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise by persons in 
authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint. 
We mean in the second place, when we speak of the “Rule of Law” as a characteristic of 
our country, not only that with us no man is above the law, but (what is a different thing) 
that here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of 
the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. 
There remains yet a third and a different sense in which the “Rule of Law” or the 
predominance of the legal spirit may be described as a special attribute of English 
institutions. We may say that the constitution is pervaded by the Rule of Law on the 
ground that the general principles of the constitution (as for example the right to 
personal liberty, or the right of public meeting) are with us the result of judicial decisions 
determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before the Courts; 
where under many foreign constitutions the security (such as it is) given to the rights of 
individuals results, or appears to result, from the general principle of the constitution.14  
In other words, after establishing that punitive interventions depend on the decision of an 
ordinary court, Dicey goes on the clarify that public authorities are subject to the common 
law, just like everyone else. He pays specific attention to the French system of 
                                                 
13 The transition from the État Légal to the État de Droit was prepared by Léon Duguit, Law in the Modern 
State (Frida & Howard Laski trans., 2013) (1919); Raymond Carré de Malberg, Contribution à la théorie 
générale de l’état, spécialement d’après les données fournies par le Droit constitutionel français (1920); 
Adhémar Esmein, Histoire de la procédure criminelle en France et spécialement de la procédure inquisitoire 
depuis le XIIIe siècle jusqu’a nos jours (1882); Maurice Hauriou, La gestion administrative: étude théorique 
de droit administratif (1899). 
14 A.V. Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 225, 228, 229 (J.W.F. 
Allison ed., 2013) (1885).  
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administrative appeal, which he finds appallingly out of touch with the equality before the 
law that inheres in the English adherence to the common law. In his “Development of 
Administrative Law in England” of 1915 Dicey actually laments the fact that the increase 
in tasks and competences of government departments has resulted in an administrative 
law that resembles, though it is by no means equivalent to, the French droit administratif. 
The critical consequence of all this is the transfer of quasi-judicial competences from 
common law courts to government departments that are bound to take into account 
requirements of expediency and the own interests of public service. As Tamanaha 
observed,15 Dicey’s analyses of the erosion of the Rule of Law are deeply entwined with his 
concerns about the activistic nature of the welfare state, which—as in Germany and 
France—creates a large domain of seemingly unchecked freedom for the administration. 
Dicey writes, “Such tranference of authority saps the foundation of the Rule of Law which 
has been for generations a leading feature of the English Constitution.”16 
This connects with the third sense of the Rule of Law, quoted above, where Dicey 
celebrates the fact that the English Constitution does not depend on the will of a 
legislator who imposes a set of general rules in one stroke, but on a series of decisions of 
ordinary courts on the rights of individuals against their government. From Dicey’s 
perspective, the fact that England has an unwritten Constitution that derives from legal 
remedies employed by private citizens against encroachments on their fundamental rights 
by government authorities confirms the spirit of liberty that—according to Dicey—
pervades English society.  
This reminds us of Montesquieu’s emphasis on an independent judiciary as the 
hallmark of political freedom and personal safety, which—in Montesquieu’s mind—are 
two sides of the same coin.17 Both depend on a moderate government, which, in turn, 
depends on coutervailing powers. The Rule of Law, in his view, is not merely a matter of 
a sovereign willingly binding itself to the law. Rather, the Rule of Law is guaranteed by 
one power stopping the other from gaining a monopoly. The most adequate metaphor 
that comes to mind is that of Odysseus resisting the lure of the Sirens. Odysseus, wishing 
to have the pleasure of hearing the Sirens’ song without succombing to their destructive 
lure, decides to tie himself to the mast of his ship. However, he does not achieve the 
freedom to have his cake and eat it too merely by self-binding. To prevent himself and his 
mates from untying the ropes that keep him in check, he waxes their ears to make sure 
that they will not respond to his pleas or commands to free him from his self-induced 
captivity. In the face of the temptations of those in power, the Rule of Law cannot be 
contingent on self-binding alone; it requires a system of checks and balances to prevent 
power-imbalances between citizens and the state. 
                                                 
15 Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory 63-65 (2004) (discussing Dicey and Hayek). 
16 A.V. Dicey, Development of Administrative Law in England, 31 L.Q. Rev. 150 (1915). 
17 Charles de Montesquieu, Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws Book XI, ch. 4 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds., 
1989) (1748).  
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Let me now turn to Radbruch’s core contribution to legal philosophy with an 
analysis of his antinomian concept of law, conducted against the background of the rise of 
the Rule of Law in Germany, taking note of relevant differences with its rise in France 
and England. In doing so I take the position that discussing the concept of law requires a 
keen eye for the Rule of Law, which is—of course—not obvious.18 
III. Radbruch’s Antinomian Conception of Law  
A. Concept and Idea of Law 
In his Legal Philosophy,19 Radbruch takes a stand against the idea that law is given or 
can be exhaustively determined before its application. By declaring upfront that we must 
distinguish between the concept and the idea of law, while explaining how the one is 
contingent upon the other, he creates a middle ground to sustain the tension between 
what law aims to achieve (the idea of law) and how it should be understood (the concept 
of law, that is, however, connected with the values inherent in the idea of law). This may 
seem overly artificial, inferred from the complexities of a neo-Kantian School that has 
little import today, but it may also remind us of the fragile nature of the conceptualization 
of something that is constitutive for our societal order. We may indeed be tempted to take 
the law as a given instead of recognizing its artificial, constructive and value-laden 
character. I dare say that Radbruch’s epistemology displays a keen sensitivity to the mode 
of existence of modern law as a construction that is contingent upon the primacy of text 
and interpretation, and thus closely aligned with the affordances of the printing press.20 
According to Radbruch, the idea of law is justice,21 in the broad sense of that 
term. This broad notion of justice brings together three values that may be incompatible 
in concrete situations: Gerechtigkeit (distributive and reciprocal justice, fairness, equality), 
Zweckmässigkeit (purposiveness, expediency, instrumentality) and Rechtssicherheit (legal 
certainty, the positivity of law). By creating a tension between the concept (description) 
and the idea (ends) of law, Radbruch ensures that though in specific cases the realization 
of these three values is often obstructed by their situated incompatibility, to qualify as law 
a practice must at least be seen to strive for such realization. His later rejection of Nazi 
                                                 
18 I am in good company, however, cf. Waldron, supra note 5. 
19 I will be quoting from Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie (1950) [hereinafter Radbruch, 
Rechtsphilosophie]; Gustav Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, in The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch and 
Dabin 47 (Edwin W. Patterson ed., Kurt Wilk trans., 1950) (reprint 2014) [hereinafter Radbruch, Legal 
Philosophy]. On his neo-Kantian background, see Sanne Taekema, The Concept of Ideals in Legal Theory 
ch. 3 (2003). 
20 Mireille Hildebrandt, A Vision of Ambient Law, in Regulating Technologies 175 (Roger Brownsword & 
Karen Yeung eds., 2008); Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law: Novel 
Entanglements of Law and Technology (forthcoming 2015). 
21 Cf. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 920 
(1990), which recognizes that law cannot achieve justice, though it can only be understood in terms of its 
ambition to achieve justice. The combination of ambition (aiming for justice) and modesty (we cannot claim 
to have achieved it) determines the tension between concept and idea of law.  
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law as law confirms this simple criterion: a legal system that does not even strive to treat 
equal cases equally, as for instance in the case of racial discrimination, can no longer 
qualify as law.22  
B. Justice, Legal Certainty and Instrumentality 23 
Justice in the narrow sense means, for Radbruch, distributive justice or equal 
treatment. This brings him close to Rawls’s famous Theory of Justice,24 which builds the 
entire architecture of a just legal system on the ideas of liberty and fairness. Both 
Radbruch and Rawls understand equality, fairness and justice in terms of geometric 
proportionality, rather than suggesting that we may simply determine what constitutes 
equal treatment from an objective point of view. Radbruch remarks that 
while justice directs us to treat equals equally, unequals unequally, it does not tell us 
anything about the viewpoint from which they are to be deemed equals or unequals in the 
first place; moreover, it determines solely the relation, and not the kind, of the treatment.25 
He continues: 
Both questions may be answered only be referring to the purpose of the law. Thus to 
justice there was added, as a second element of the idea of law, expediency or suitability 
for a purpose.26 
This, however, introduces a relativist notion into the realm of the law, since—according 
to Radbruch—the purpose of the law cannot be determined by the law itself, and depends 
on different notions of the general interest. In his chapter on the instrumentality, or 
expediency, of the law, he distinguishes between three types of purposes which the law 
can serve: individual freedom, collective well-being and artistic or scientific accomplishment. In 
his opinion, each polity will have to decide what type of society, collective or community 
it wishes to constitute, aiming for a society that celebrates individual liberty, a collective 
striving for the highest common good or a community that works to achieve excellence in 
science or art. Distributive justice can only become operational from the perspective of a 
particular type of purpose, which engages the instrumentality and expediency of the law. 
Equal treatment will have a different meaning when law serves the goals of liberalism, 
than when it serves the goals of collective well-being. This entails that distributive justice 
in the realm of individual liberty has different implications than in the realm of public 
utility, which reminds us of the different rationalities of the domains of Justiz (individual 
                                                 
22 Gustav Radbruch, Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy (1945), 26 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 13-15 (Bonnie 
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 2006). 
23 This part of the paper builds on my analysis in Hildebrandt, Indeterminacy, supra note 11; see also 
Paulson, supra note 2. 
24 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2005). 
25 Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, supra note 19, at 107. 
26 Id. at 107-08. 
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liberty) and Polizei (general welfare) in their nineteenth-century manifestations. Obviously, 
however, liberal democracies combine these goals, making the law contingent upon 
differential views of the public good. In line with that Radbruch notes that 
[t]he law as the order of living together cannot be handed over to disagreements between 
the views of individuals; it must be one order over all of them.27  
This introduces the need for legal certainty: 
The certainty of the law requires law to be positive: if what is just cannot be settled, then 
what ought to be right must be laid down; and this must be done by an agency able to 
carry through what it lays down.28 
This is where Radbruch suggests that at some point  
[i]t is more important that the strife of legal views be ended than that it be determined 
justly and expediently. The existence of a legal order is more important than its justice 
and expediency, which constitute the second great task of the law, while the first, equally 
approved by all, is legal certainty, that is, order, or peace.29 
In the section on legality and legalism (below), I will return to this point as it marks 
Radbruch’s acuity in relation to legal order as a precondition for both justice and 
purposiveness. First, however, we must establish whether these quotes justify labelling 
Radruch as a legal positivist in the traditional sense of formal legal positivism, keeping in 
mind that caring for the positivity of the law is not a prerogative of formal legal 
positivists. Though the rise of internal and external sovereignty is constitutive for the 
positivity of law,30 it does not exhaust the meaning or the validity of law. However, in his 
prewar writings, Radbruch’s understanding of law seems to favor legal certainty as the most 
crucial and distinctive element of the law. Referring, in a footnote, to Schmitt, he writes: 
The order of living together cannot be left to the particular conceptions of law of 
individual citizens, as different people may well have contradictory ideas, requiring a 
unitary regulation from a supra-individual position. . . . If nobody can establish what is 
just, somebody must decide what should be lawful, and positive law should fulfil the 
assignment, to end the contradictory conceptions of law by means of an authoritative 
verdict. The positivity of the law must depend on a will that can impose itself against any 
contradictory conception of law.31 
Clearly, Radbruch views sovereignty as constitutive for positive law. His reference to 
Schmitt suggests that positive law cannot be reduced to distributive or reciprocal justice, 
                                                 
27 Id. at 108. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Hildebrandt, Origins, supra note 11. 
31 Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, supra note 19, at 179 (translation Mireille Hildebrandt [MH]); cf. Radbruch, 
Legal Philosophy, supra note 19, at 116-17. The footnote reads (translation MH): “Carl Schmitt has qualified such 
an understanding of legal validity as decisionism. He situates it most clearly with Hobbes [auctoritas, non veritas 
facit legem], cf. ‘Die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens,’ 1954, p. 27 and 35 [at the same instance 
decisionism and normativism].” This footnote has been added by the editor of the 1950 edition. It was taken 
from Radbruch’s handwritten notes in the 1932 edition. See Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, supra note 19, at 9. 
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without, however, concluding that positive law has no relationship to what is just. As 
mentioned above,32 in his discussion of the antinomian character of the idea of law, he 
explains how legal certainty, justice and purposiveness cohere. Though justice and legal 
certainty require equal treatment, they cannot provide the measure or nature of the 
treatment, for which we need an understanding of the purpose of the treatment, and a 
decision. After observing that the purpose of law (which he qualifies as the public good, 
whichever way it is conceived) is a matter of differing opinions, he concludes that this 
calls for a decision on the content of the law that is binding even on those who would not 
agree. This conclusion confirms the priority of legal certainty—as in the text quoted 
above—and I will now quote the original German text to highlight the intricate nuances 
in his usage of German that get lost in translation: 
Die Sicherheit des Rechts fordert Positivität des Rechts: wenn nicht festgestellt werden 
kann, was gerecht ist, so muß festgesetzt werden, was rechtens sein soll und zwar von 
einer Stelle, die, was sie festsetzt, auch durchzusetzen in der Lage ist.33  
It seems that Radbruch agrees with Schmitt that any order is always better than no order, 
and that law in the end depends on the power to decide and enforce the law when 
agreement on its content cannot be reached. This, of course, regards both the decision of 
a legislator to enact a law despite dissensus on its content and the decision of a court to 
interpret a source of law in a way that one of the parties or current legal doctrine would 
reject. How does this position Radbruch in the minefield between formal and substantive 
conceptions of the Rechtsstaat, and how does it situate him in relation to legalism and legality?  
Let me say, first, that I am not interested in discussing whether or not Radbruch 
was a legal positivist. This, to me, is a stalemate discussion, which would require measuring 
Radbruch against the yardstick of the morality thesis and the separation thesis,34 whether 
they are understood to be mutually exclusive as well as jointly exhaustive, as partly 
overlapping, or as leaving room for a third way out.35 The problem is that the morality 
                                                 
32 Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, supra note 19. Radbruch speaks of Zweckmässigkeit (purposiveness, 
expediency, instrumentality), which should however not be understood as effectiveness per se. It concerns 
an orientation towards the public good, which can be defined in different ways, depending on one’s political 
views. See Der Zweck des Rechts (The Purpose of Law), in Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, supra note 19, at 
146-55. In later work he speaks of the Gemeinnutz als Ziel des Rechts (common interest as the purpose of law). 
See Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, supra note 19, at 336.  
33 Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, supra note 19, at 169 (italics in the original) (differentiating between 
feststellen and festsetzen to emphasize the difference between consensus on the basis of a free discussion and a 
decision that has force of law; and differentiating between festsetzen and durchsetzen to emphasize the fact that 
law is not only about enacting legislation but also about being capable of enforcing law). 
34 It is usually claimed that the morality thesis determines that the validity of positive law does not depend 
on its moral worth, while the separation thesis determines that law and morality should be separated due to 
the separation of powers in the political realm. A more productive perspective can be found in David 
Dyzenhaus, The Genealogy of Legal Positivism, 24 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 39 (2004). 
35 Cf. Leawoods, supra note 2, who reduces Radbruch’s position to one for “normal” times and one for 
“emergency.” This makes a lot of sense, but it adds little to our understanding of the richness of his concept 
of law for “ordinary” times. See also Paulson, supra note 2. 
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thesis usually reduces to a particular understanding of natural law, whereas natural law has 
its own rather diverse history.36 The separation thesis is meant to exhaust the meaning of 
law in reference to its positivity, often reduced to its dependence on the authority of the 
state. Radbruch indeed highlights the critical importance of positive law and its alignment 
with the power of the state to ensure its effectiveness, but he is not a “positivist” in the 
sense of entirely reducing law to legal certainty. Already in 1932 he writes that 
[f]inally, too, it will appear that even the validity of positive law that is unjust and wrong 
cannot be maintained unqualifiedly, hence the question of validity may be considered not 
only from the standpoint of legal certainty but also that of justice and expediency.37 
This firmly establishes his argument for the antinomian character of his legal philosophy. 
His understanding of law should not be pressed into the mould of either natural law, 
which in his own words “tried to conjure the entire contents of the law out of the formal 
principle of justice and at the same time therefrom to derive the validity of law,” or 
positivism, which “saw only the positivity and certainty of the law and caused a long 
standstill in the systematic examination of the expediency, not to mention the justice, of 
enacted law, for decades nearly silencing legal philosophy and legal policy.”38 He 
emphasizes the historical and cultural nature of the shifting prominence of certainty, 
justice and expediency, notably referring to enlightened despotism, which “sought to raise 
the principle of expendience to sole dominion, unhesitatingly pushing aside justice and 
legal certainty in its administration of law by cabinet fiats.”39 Radbruch maintains that the 
problem resides in the one-sidedness of attempts to reduce the aims of all to one, not in 
the contradiction that is inherent in their eventual incompatibility in a particular situation. 
Trying to resolve the tension leads to insecurity, injustice or/and ineffective law, whereas 
the antinomian character of the idea of law should instead lead to the discernment and 
acuity required to decide a legal issue in the face of actual incompatibilities.  
Paulson has argued that in his prewar Legal Philosophy Radbruch seems to 
differentiate between the duty of the legislator to enact equal protection, based on justice 
only, and the duty of the court to apply a valid statute even if he thinks it is unjust, based 
only on legal certainty.40 Paulson has suggested that Radbruch corrects this mistake in his 
postwar writings, where he finds that in extraordinary circumstances, such as twelve years 
of Nazi rule, the judge should discriminate between a legal statute that is unjust and one 
that is not even directed to justice. However, as abundantly illustrated above, this is 
precisely Radbruch’s point in his earlier text: whereas a judge should not determine what 
                                                 
36 Tamanaha, supra note 15, at 11 (on natural law with Cicero), 18-19 (on natural law with Aquinas), 28 (on 
legislation as codification of natural law in the late Middle Ages and the beginnings of modernity), 47-59 (on 
natural law and Locke, Montesquieu and the Federalist Papers).  
37 Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, supra note 19, at 111. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 Paulson, supra note 2, at 496 (on the judge), 500 (on the legislator and on the idea that Radbruch’s later 
emphasis on justice was the correction of the mistake).  
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law is just or unjust, statutes that are not even aimed at achieving justice can no longer be 
qualified as law.  
Radbruch’s celebration of the antinomian idea of the law goes against the grain of 
the so-called formal conception of the Rechtsstaat as advocated by Stahl, because Stahl’s 
conception creates a domain where expediency rules. Radbruch’s concept must similarly 
reject the formal conception of the Rechtsstaat as advocated by Kelsen, because it 
mistakenly ignores the relevance of both morality and expedience for the constitution of 
law. Similarly, though Radbruch acknowledges the role of the decision of the sovereign in 
the significance he attaches to the positivity of the law, his antinomian idea of law goes 
beyond Schmitt’s priority for the decision over the norm. This is interesting, because in 
the end Radbruch turns Schmitt inside out: in his postwar writings he posits the 
possibility of an extraordinary situation that requires a judge to qualify a statute as non-law 
that refutes application, which would require the judge to decide on the exception.41 
IV. Legalism and Legality 
A. The Procedural Enactment of the Rule of Law 
I have always felt unease with Foucault’s analysis of the law, notably in his 
magnificent La vérité et les formes juridiques,42 because he somehow stops his examination of 
the judicial trial after confronting the inquisitorial procedure, never arriving at the fair 
trial. Even in Discipline and Punish, he opposes the pervasive normalization generated by 
disciplinary practices with the rhetoric of Enlightenment thinking to unmask the latter as 
an impotent discourse. But he fails to pay any sustained attention to the actual workings 
of constitutional protections of due process, the fair trial, or the criminal law principle of 
legality. It seems that he mistakes law for legalism, taking for granted that modern law got 
stuck in nineteenth-century formalism and positivism. Foucault’s analyses are pivotal, 
however, in taking the perspective of how law actually operates in terms of process and 
procedure, instead of restricting the conceptualization to sterile exercises at the most 
general level of analysis. 
In his discussion of the importance of procedure for the Rule of Law, Waldron 
has emphasized the curious fact that legal philosophers tend to restrict the discussion on 
the Rule of Law to a choice between substantive and formal conceptions.43 He defines 
formal conceptions as those focused on the form of legal norms, taking Fuller’s principles 
of the inner morality of the law as a prime example: generality, publicity, prospectivity, 
intelligibility, consistency, practicability, stability and congruence. Though Fuller qualifies 
his principles as “procedural,” Waldron notes that he actually means that they are not 
                                                 
41 Radbruch, supra note 22. 
42 Michel Foucault, Truth and Juridical Forms, 2 Social Identities 327 (Lawrence Williams & Catherine Merlen 
trans., 1996); Mireille Hildebrandt, The Trial of the Expert: Épreuve and Preuve, 10 New Crim. L. Rev. 78 (2007). 
43 Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure, in Getting to the Rule of Law 3 
(James E. Fleming ed., 2012). 
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substantive. Only the last principle pays some attention to the institutional dimension that 
interfaces the existence of abstract rules (whether formal or substantive) with guarantees 
of an impartial and independent adjudication. It seems as if the Rule of Law is largely seen 
as a matter of either substantive matters of justice (e.g., respect for private property, 
prohibitions of torture, individual liberty and democratic self-determination) or formal 
matters of legal certainty (generality, publicity, prospectivity, etc.). In reference to Dicey’s 
emphasis on the role of ordinary courts, Waldron argues that procedural and institutional 
elements may be far more conclusive for the Rule of Law than the emphasis on either 
formal or substantive conditions. This is interesting also because Waldron finds that the 
lack of attention to the role of an independent tribunal, a fair hearing and other 
procedural safeguards diminishes our understanding of the Rule of Law, and—indeed—
of law itself: 
For my part, I do not think we should regard something as a legal system absent the 
existence and operation of the sort of institutions we call courts. By courts, I mean 
institutions that apply norms and directives established in the name of the whole society 
to individual cases and that settle disputes about the application of those norms. And I 
mean institutions that do this through the medium of hearings, formal events that are 
tightly structured procedurally in order to enable an impartial body to determine the 
rights and responsibilities of particular persons fairly and effectively after hearing 
evidence and argument from both sides.44 
Discussing how both Hart and Raz define the institutions that decide on the application 
and interpretation of the law, Waldron observes that they seem to believe that procedural 
safeguards “are relevant to law only at an evaluative level, not at the conceptual level.”45 
Instead, Waldron argues that “[t]here is a distressing tendency among academic legal 
philosophers to see law simply as a set of normative propositions and to pursue their task 
of developing an understanding of the concept of law to consist simply in understanding 
what sort of normative propositions these are. But law comes to life in institutions.” 
Building on Waldron and others,46 I believe that the debate on the meaning of the 
Rule of Law has been mystified by framing its interpretation as either formal or 
substantive. Formal conceptions are then associated with legalism (that is often equated 
with legality),47 whereas substantive conceptions are often associated with moral 
                                                 
44 Id. at 12. 
45 Id. at 11 (the citation refers to Raz, but basically repeats Waldron’s previous critique of Hart). 
46 Cf. Mireille Hildebrandt, Expert, Burger En Jurist: (hoe) Verstaan Zij Elkaar?, in In Het Licht van Deze 
Overwegingen 243 (E.T. Feteris et al. eds., 2004). I developed a theory of legal argumentation that is 
similarly focused on procedure, practice and communication rather than on its end result, inspired by more 
continental philosophers such as Benoit Frydman, Grandeur, Déclin et Renouveau de la Plaidoirie, in La 
Plaidoirie 37 (1998); Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’État (2009); 
Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics I (2010); Slavoj Zizek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan 
through Popular Culture (1991).  
47 Neil MacCormick, The Ethics of Legalism, 2 Ratio Juris 184, 184 (1989) (“With all faults, legalism is a 
prerequisite of free government.”). Judith N. Shklar, Legalism (1964) criticized legalism as committing to a 
conservative ideological worldview, mainly because of its belief that “complying with rules is a moral mode 
of being in the world.” Robin West, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 119, 122 (2003). 
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legitimacy. This nicely ties in with a mistaken understanding of Radbruch’s view on law. It 
should be clear that I am not impressed with adherents to the transformation thesis who 
equate his early emphasis on the positivity of the law with positivism and legalism, while 
equating his postwar writings with a belated confession to the attractions of natural law 
that fits well with a moralistic understanding of legal legitimacy. What then, is the 
difference between legalism and legality, and how does it fare between substantial and 
formal understandings of law and the Rule of Law?  
Legalism makes the legitimacy of lawful interventions dependent on pre-existing 
legal rules, whatever their content, meaning that governmental interventions require a formal 
legal ground that justifies the intervention. A more developed version of such legalism 
would fare well with Fuller’s principles; generality, publicity, prospectivity, intelligibility, 
consistency, practicability, stability and congruency are all focused on reliability, 
comprehensibility, foreseeability and the certainty they provide. Unlike legalism, legality 
does not restrict itself to the requirement of a legal competence to perform governmental 
interventions, based in or on an Act of Parliament. A discerning conception of legality 
entails that the law both constitutes and limits competences for governmental intervention, 
while constitution and limitations take root in the antinomian interplay of justice, legal 
certainty and purposiveness. This translates into various types of balancing acts that are, 
themselves, constrained by the demands of justice, certainty and purposiveness. The 
circularity that thus pervades legal development is not vicious but virtuous; not 
complacent but productive. It triggers acuity and discernment with regard to legal decision 
making instead of thinking in terms of mechanical applications of existing law. In case of 
measures that infringe fundamental rights, the balancing act will, for instance, require the 
legislator, the administration, and the court to investigate: first, the legitimacy of the aim 
that is targeted; second, the necessity of the intervention and its proportionality in relation 
to the legitimate aim; and third, the attribution of a sufficiently specific legal competence 
that renders such interventions foreseeable and contestable, and stipulates adequate legal 
safeguards. The latter demonstrates the legality-requirement; meaning that a legal ground 
both constitutes and limits a specific governmental competence. Those familiar with the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) will recognize the triple test 
for governmental measures that infringe human rights such as privacy.48 The point here is 
to detect where legality differs from legalism. Legality, in this sense, refers to justice 
(proportionality), to legal certainty (the legal ground in positive law, with the necessary 
safeguards) and purposiveness or expediency (the legitimate aim of the intervention, the 
requirement of effective remedies). Legalism, instead, reduces all this to the correctly 
enacted legal ground, which may or may not offer any protection, leaving the subject of 
government interventions dependent on a rule by law instead of the Rule of Law. Even if 
the sovereign that rules by law is the nation or the Parliament, legalism leaves individual 
subjects without effective remedies against arbitrary rule. This does not accord with 
                                                 
48 On such balancing acts in the context of anti-terrorism law, see Stefan Sottiaux, Terrorism and the 
Limitation of Rights: The ECHR and the US Constitution (2008). 
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Radbruch’s perspective and in point of fact explains why he believes that law should tame 
sovereignty. The Rule of Law is not merely about self-binding, which would equate with 
eighteenth century enlightened despotism (which was essentially rule by law). As his 
investigations into the origin of the criminal law demonstrate, to qualify as law instead of 
administration, legality demands that sovereignty be subdivided into countervailing 
powers. This, however, implies that the protection offered by the principle of legality 
against arbitrary rule by law will depend on effective remedies that organize the state’s 
adherence to the Rule of Law. This confirms the need to rethink conceptions of law in 
terms of their institutional requirements, determining how decisions about the application 
of legal norms are to be organized and embedded in concrete legal orders.  
B. Norm, Decision and Institution of Law 
Legality, as distinct from legalism, cannot be defined as either a purely formal or a 
purely substantive conception of law. It does not reduce to law’s positivity, nor to its 
instrumentality or to substantive morality. The core concept of proportionality that 
defines the aim of the balancing act that is implied in the legality principle refers to a 
decision that is the outcome of a contradictory procedure.49 Under the Rule of Law, 
decisions on issues of law are not prepared in the mind of a single person; they are not the 
result of a singular inner monologue. The balancing act should be performed on the 
cutting edge of an adversarial debate, to make sure that all the relevant voices are heard 
and taken into account, even if a particular point of view is rejected. Precisely because the 
idea of law is antinomian, in concrete cases the legal effect of prevailing legal conditions 
will often depend on incompatible requirements of justice, certainty and instrumentality. 
That is, the interpretation of the legal conditions that are claimed to be relevant and 
applicable is the outcome of a decision, which should, however, be informed by careful 
consideration of alternative views on the interplay between facts and law. In that sense, 
legality does not so much refer to proportionality as a form of rational calculation, which 
is basically a mental act, but to adequate procedural settings, division of tasks and 
attribution of roles. Legality presumes and therefore requires a “mise en scène” that 
prevents one party from systematically overruling the other, and quite clearly this entails a 
pivotal role for the courts as an independent actor capable of safeguarding the 
contestability of both the framing and the actual implementation of government 
intervention (even if that intervention concerns the enforcement of a civil injunction or 
the transfer of property). In that sense legality is not only visible in the triple test of the 
right to privacy in the European context, but also in the procedural constraints that make 
legal claims in civil or criminal cases contestable in a court of law (the right to a fair trial in 
art. 6 of the ECHR).50  
                                                 
49 In Anglo-American parlance this would be “adversary procedure,” organized in a somewhat different 
fashion than the contradictory procedure in continental law systems.  
50 Cf. Waldron, supra note 43, at 6, who sums up a set of procedural safeguards very similar to those of art. 
6: “a hearing by an impartial tribunal . . . ; a legally-trained judicial officer, whose independence of other 
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Though it should be clear by now that legality cannot be equated with legalism, we 
still need to answer the question of how it relates to enacted law. If legality refers to the 
procedural enactment of the Rule of Law, we need to establish which type of procedural 
enactment does and which type does not institute and sustain the Rule of Law. Surely, 
legality does not agree with just any type of procedure. In his magnificent Du procès pénal, 
the French judge and legal scholar Salas developed the elements for an interdisciplinary 
theory of legal procedure, notably in relation to punitive sanctions.51 Salas distinguishes 
three models of legal procedure: mediation, inquisition and the equitable procedure. To 
compare these models he elicits four elements that structure the debate that is at the core 
of legal procedure: “the third” (a person or institution) that should create middle ground 
between the adversaries; the relationship between written and oral proceedings; the claim 
that initiates the procedure; and, finally, the judgment that realigns the facts and the legal 
norms that are at stake.  
Mediation is at stake in societies without a state monopoly on law-making and 
violence; as such it seems irrelevant for legality in the context of a state. What Salas calls 
the inquisitorial procedure is closest to the kind of procedural enactment that accords 
with an early strand of legalism, a pure rule by law of a sovereign ruler. Here, “the third” is 
a magistrate who speaks in the name of an undivided sovereign to which he is 
hierarchically subordinate (he is not a mediator, but also not independent). This 
magistrate investigates the incriminated subject on the basis of written documents and 
pre-existing legal norms without creating any distance between accuser and accused, or 
even between judge and accused. In fact, both the judge and the prosecutor impose 
themselves on the accused, and often the functions of judge and prosecutor are in the 
hand of the same magistrate. The claim that initiates the procedure may be hidden or 
changed during the proceedings, though at some point it may be forced upon the accused 
in the form of a confession. Finally, the judgment is applied to the subject by means of a 
potentially arbitrary interpretation of the law, meant to mold the facts into the relevant 
legal norms and vice versa, until the accusation can be transformed into a conviction. This 
type of inquisitorial procedure demonstrates how the legal certainty that seems to derive 
from the application of written legal norms can be turned inside out if the process of 
application is not organized on the basis of contestation, and if the roles of parties and 
decision maker are not assigned in a way that prevents inequality of arms between the 
parties or unwarranted bias on the side of the judge. It reminds us that if the accused is 
                                                                                                                                             
agencies of government is assured; a right to representation by counsel and to the time and opportunity 
required to prepare a case; a right to be present . . . ; a right to confront witnesses against the detainee; a 
right to an assurance that the evidence presented by the government has been gathered in a properly 
supervised way; a right to present evidence in one’s own behalf; a right to make legal argument about the 
bearing of the evidence and about the bearing of the various legal norms relevant to the case; a right to hear 
reasons from the tribunal when it reaches its decision, which are responsive to the evidence and arguments 
presented before it; and some right of appeal to a higher tribunal of a similar character.” 
51 Denis Salas, Du procès pénal: Eléments pour une théorie interdisciplinaire du procès (1992); cf. Martin 
Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (1986). 
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not given the standing she needs to resist either the evidence as presented or the law as 
interpreted—or both—the court gains a dangerous monopoly.  
When discussing the equitable procedure, Salas notes that here “the third” is 
independent of the government and impartial in relation to the parties. The claim that 
initiates the procedure is known to the defendant and defines the proceedings. Though 
the preparations of the trial may consist of written documents, only the evidence that has 
been disclosed during trial can be used as proof, with the possibility of contestation by the 
defendant. Finally, a conviction is only possible on the basis of a prior law that is 
sufficiently clear as well as ambiguous to provide both certainty and contestability. The 
equitable procedure is directly linked with legality, in the sense that the competence to 
punish depends on its own contestability in a court of law.  
Procedural enactment of the Rule of Law seems to require a specific type of 
institutionalisation, to enable the making and application of legal norms, which includes 
the decisions made by legislators and courts on what legal norms will apply under what 
conditions and circumstances. It should be obvious, but it is nevertheless crucial, that 
legal norms and legal decisions are contingent upon the institutions they inform, 
demanding close attention to the actual affordances of such institutions. Though I believe 
that Radbruch’s neo-Kantian concept of law both assumes and produces a specific type of 
institutionalisation, this only becomes visible in his “other” work, notably on the origins 
of criminal law in the class of serfs, as discussed elsewhere.52  
To highlight the connection between a procedural conception of both law and the 
Rule of Law and specific institutionalizations of the law, I end this inquiry with a 
reference to Schmitt’s 1934 introduction to three types of legal thinking.53 Whereas most 
legal and political philosophers are aware of Schmitt’s decisionism, few scholars discuss 
his postwar conversion to an institutional theory of law. His first type of legal thinking 
concerns thinking in terms of rules or statutes, and lays claim to impersonal and objective 
thinking;54 he labels this as normativism. The second type concerns thinking in terms of 
determinations or decisions (Entscheidungsdenken), which he qualifies as personal; he labels 
this as decisionism. Interestingly, Schmitt finds that legal positivism is a hybrid that fuses 
normativism with—often hidden—decisionism. With the third type he introduces an 
alternative understanding of law under the heading of “concrete order thinking” (konkretes 
Ordnungsdenken). He defines a concrete order as suprapersonal, and emphasizes its organic 
character. Such a concrete order, he finds, is given but also subject to growth and it 
incorporates the norms it generates and by which it is defined, as well as the decisions it 
generates and that ground it. The organic metaphor is meant to oppose the artificiality 
                                                 
52 Hildebrandt, Origins, supra note 11.  
53 Carl Schmitt, Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens (1993) (1934); Joseph W. Bendersky, 
On the Three Types of Juristic Thought (2004); cf. Susan Mary Twist, Retrospectivity at Nuremberg: The 
Nature and Limits of a Schmittian Analysis (Doctoral thesis, University of Central Lancashire, 2012). 
54 Schmitt, supra note 53, at 12.  
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suggested by legal positivism, which emphasizes the man-made character of positive law 
(thus endorsing a kind of decisionism).55  
Those familiar with Schmitt’s earlier take on sovereignty may be surprised to find 
that in the end Schmitt opts for “concrete order thinking” as the most appropriate form 
of legal thinking. Though he agrees with Hobbes that a decision may spring from a 
normative void and a concrete un-order, his new position highlights that stability and 
continuity cannot be trusted within a purely decisionist framework. Though Schmitt is still 
keenly aware that “sovereign is he who decides on the exception,” he also admits that the 
“peace, security and order of a societas civilis”56 that is instituted by the sovereign’s 
decision require a tangible order. Such order shapes the relationships between people in a 
concrete society under the aegis of real leadership, binding people on the basis of heartfelt 
“honor, obedience, discipline and loyalty.”57 Considering Schmitt’s well-known loyalty to 
Nazi Germany, the reader will not be surprised that Schmitt openly refers to the 
important insights gained from the movement of National Socialism, and to the pivotal 
contributions of a concrete Führer, capable of inspiring his people to act as loyal and 
morally responsible elements of a Volksganzen.58 
We may be tempted to dismantle Schmitt’s position as fascist, dangerous and 
unworthy of further investigation. However, the reader may have noticed that Radbruch 
made a handwritten note in his 1932 edition of Legal Philosophy,59 where he explicitly refers 
to this particular text, noting that Schmitt depicts the positivity of the law as dependent 
on, or at least related to, decisonism. This is interesting, as it shows that Radbruch studied 
and appreciated Schmitt’s analysis of legal thinking without in any way endorsing 
Schmitt’s position with regard to Nazi Germany. I believe, therefore, that it may be 
worthwhile to investigate whether Schmitt’s analysis of legal positivism and his newly 
found “concrete order thinking” could—perhaps paradoxically—leverage the procedural 
enactment of the Rule of Law, discussed above.  
For Schmitt, the problem with legal positivism is its adherence to an entirely 
artificial, constructed law, disentangled from both its historical roots and the concrete 
societal fabric which it seeks to regulate. One could take this a little further and suggest 
that Schmitt criticized—avant la lettre—the regulatory paradigm that has somehow 
convinced many of today’s lawyers to frame their own subject in terms of regulation, 
highlighting a voluntarist and instrumentalist understanding of law. The regulatory 
paradigm actually derives from cybernetics and policy science, and views law as a mere 
                                                 
55 This seems to compare well with Hayek’s position as expounded by Waldron, supra note 43, at 23, where 
Waldron criticizes some scholars for their “mythic reverence for common law, not conceived necessarily as 
deliberately crafted by judges, but understood as welling up impersonally as a sort of resultant of the activity 
of courts,” taking Hayek as an example. 
56 Schmitt, supra note 53, at 24. 
57 Id. at 52. 
58 Id. at 49. 
59 Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, supra note 19. 
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instrument to order society.60 It reduces law to its purposiveness and thus comes close to 
a Polizeiwissenschaft: how to intervene in such a way that a desirable outcome is achieved 
(economic growth, full employment, redistribution of income, a high level of education or 
whatever). The hybrid of normativism and decisionism that makes for legal positivism (in 
the eyes of Schmitt) actually invites activism on the side of both the legislator and the 
courts, well aware that they both have the competence to “decide the law.” In the end, 
such legal positivism digs its own grave, since regulators will soon find other, less 
burdensome, types of instruments to achieve their policy goals. Where in the context of 
the Rule of Law the whole point of having a positive law is to turn power into 
competence,61 entailing an operation that is simultaneously constititive and limitative, the 
doctrine of legal positivism has little to say about what goals the law will serve and what 
safeguards it will offer. This all depends on the sovereign that imposes its will by means of 
the law, whether this sovereign is the democratic legislator or an enlightened despot. In 
the end, this sovereign can opt for other means to impose its will. Nudging people into 
compliance, or applying techno-regulation to induce certain behaviours are just two 
contemporary examples of a regulatory paradigm that has no necessary relationship with 
legality and the Rule of Law. Schmitt’s critique of legal positivism is in part very much to 
the point. However, his solution is hampered by his own quest for a single point of 
reference. His depiction of “concrete legal order thinking” is indebted to the French legal 
scholar Hariou, the antagonist of the famous legal positivist Duguit. Hariou did not 
develop a legal theory, but investigated legal practice, in particular that of administrative 
law, by studying the decisions of the French Conseil d’État, the highest administrative 
court.62 Interestingly, Schmitt emphasizes Hariou’s notion of a situation établie, which he 
translates as “a normal, stabilized situation” (an inversion of his definition of the 
sovereign decision).63 The situation établie is the core concept of Hariou’s theory of the 
institutions, according to Schmitt, and in the case of administrative law this “normal, 
stabilized situation” entails the ordering of instances of appeal, the hierarchy of offices, 
their autonomy, inner checks and balances, inner discipline, honour and professional 
secrecy.64 For Schmitt this concrete legal ordering rises above the a-historic, abstract legal 
                                                 
60 See the excellent article by Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 Austl. J. Legal Phil. 1 (2002), 
whose working definition of “regulation” as “the intentional activity of attempting to control, order or 
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Social Vitalism, in The French Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, Georges Renard, Joseph T. Delos 93 
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that Latour’s understanding of law has many overlaps (and differences) with, for instance, MacCormick’s 
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norm as well as the highly personal decision, and goes way beyond their hybridization in 
legal positivism. It is more powerful, more trustworthy, more sustainable and, finally, 
more real. And, finally, Schmitt concludes that the state, rather than being a system of 
norms or the source of a pure sovereign decision, must be understood as the institution of 
institutions, the order of all other orderings, in which “all autonomous institutions find their 
protection and their order.”65 If this sounds like Hegel, the reader will not be surprised that 
for Schmitt, Hegel’s legal and political philosophy is, indeed, one of the most forceful 
examples of the “concrete order thinking” he embraces. The state, with Hegel, is not a legal 
norm, nor a singular decision, but a Gestalt that brings together both reason and ethics, in 
the form of an “individual totality”:66 “order of orders, institution of institutions.”67 
V. End(s) 
Let us return once more to Radbruch. It is clear that for Radbruch the artificiality of 
positive law is not a problem to be solved, but a consequence of the concrete 
incompatibility of the aims of the law, coupled with the fact that people will not agree on 
what should be the purpose of their society, collective or community. The artificiality is a 
productive, creative outcome of human adversity. The constructive nature of law—from 
Radbruch’s perspective—does not concord with a legal positivism that reduces law to the 
legal certainty of positive law (what Schmitt saw as the hybrid concoction of normativism 
and decisionism). On the contrary, the challenge to compatibilize the aims of positivity 
with those of justice and instrumentality is what triggers construction and reconstruction. 
This is an ongoing process and it cannot be taken for granted—as Radbruch testified after 
his experience of Nazi rule. At some point, the lawyer—whether judge or legislator—must 
acknowledge that the procedural enactment of legal code or case law fails to even aim for 
justice and legal certainty and instrumentality. At that point the lawyer is called upon to 
decide on the exception: to deny validity to what looks like positive law. Not because of 
her own moral preferences but because law has been separated from the values that 
enable us to qualify a statute or verdict as law.  
The productive nature of artificial, positive law, however, does not, in itself, 
protect individual citizens against injustice. Even if artificial law is explained in terms of 
the choices that must be made when justice and legal certainty, or justice and 
instrumentality, or legal certainty and instrumentality are incompatible in concrete 
situations, we need institutional arrangements to see to it that reasonable choices are 
made. We need to make sure that such incompatibility is not used as an argument to push 
for an agenda that allows for decisions with a bias against vulnerable adversaries or, 
simply, for decisions biased to protect the interests of already privileged groups. This 
requires a situation établie with effective countervailing powers, checks and balances, and 
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equitable procedures. Contrary to Schmitt’s suggestion, this situation établie cannot be 
understood and preserved on the basis of its concrete reality; to be sustainable it requires 
keen attention to the normative framework it embodies and the backing of sovereign 
power. Norm, decision and institution are mutually constitutive or interdependent. On 
top of that, to qualify as law, their interplay should vouch for the ends of justice, legal 
certainty and the law’s own instrumentality, in all modesty. 
